Interim decree — subsequent application declared inadmissible · R.G. 11120-1/2026
Unofficial translation of the SOS Patto summary. The original decision or document is available in Italian only.
Headnote
Even where the merits appear to fall within the jurisdiction of another specialised division (here Perugia, seat of the section of the Commissione territoriale that decided), the court seised may adopt a strictly interim and protective measure to safeguard the right to remain, applying the principle of Article 669-quater of the Code of Civil Procedure and the principles of effective protection and non-refoulement, without anticipating or consolidating jurisdiction over the merits. On the interim merits: Article 79(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 identifies the applicable rules by reference to the «lodging» of the application, a technical term (Article 28) that cannot be equated with the expression of the wish to apply (Article 26) and cannot be overridden by the interpreter; the regulation therefore applies to the application lodged on 30 July 2026. However, the delay attributable to the Administration in registering and lodging the application cannot be held against the applicant so as to produce unfavourable consequences for him, provided that the wish was expressed before 12 June 2026 to an authority that was competent or required to forward it, that the applicant cooperated, that the former time limits for registration and lodging had already expired by 12 June (as a general rule, expressions of the wish prior to 1 June 2026) and that the new regime entails a concretely unfavourable consequence for the right to remain, the suspensive effect or other safeguards. The wish having been expressed on 8 May 2026 by certified e-mail to the Questura of Arezzo and the application lodged only on 30 July, the subsequent application would have been handled in the former accelerated procedure (Article 28-bis(1), point (a), of Legislative Decree 25/2008) with a decision within five days; decided only on 7 August, the procedure lost the special character that justifies the derogation from automatic suspension (Joint Chambers No. 11399/2024). The contested decision is suspended.
The Tribunal of Florence (judge Umberto Castagnini) suspends the decision declaring a subsequent application inadmissible from a position that is original compared with the other decisions in this line: the regulation applies to an application lodged after 12 June 2026, because the wording of Article 79(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 «does not appear capable of being overridden by the interpreter»; but the Administration's delay cannot be held against the applicant.
The applicant had expressed the wish to submit a new application on 8 May 2026 and was able to lodge it only on 30 July, «according to the timetable set by the administrative authority».
The decision comes from a section of the Commission based in Perugia, so that «on a first assessment» jurisdiction over the merits would lie with the Tribunal of Perugia. The Florence judge does not decline: applying the principle of Article 669-quater of the Code of Civil Procedure, and because removal carried out before the question of jurisdiction is settled «could produce effects that are hardly reversible», interim protection «cannot be deferred until the final identification of the competent court». The measure remains «strictly interim and protective».
«Lodging» has a technical meaning in the regulation, which distinguishes the application made (Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1348), registered (Article 27) and lodged (Article 28); Article 79(3) chooses the third. Having acknowledged the force of the opposing argument drawn from recital 27, the judge considers that the opposite interpretative option «meets a not insignificant obstacle in the wording»: this is the position contrary to that of Trib. Naples.
The decree distinguishes «two logically independent problems»: which rules apply, and whether the public administration's delay may produce unfavourable consequences for a person who did in good time what could be expected of him. To the second question it answers that
it is an expression of a general principle of coherence of the legal system that the authority cannot benefit from its own failure to comply with an obligation, nor derive from it unfavourable consequences for a person who has promptly exercised his right
The applicant could rely on compliance with the time limits then in force (Article 26(2-bis) of Legislative Decree 25/2008: three days, extendable to ten); otherwise «the breach of the time limit binding the authority would be treated as a condition for applying more restrictive rules».
So that the criterion does not empty Article 79 of substance, the Tribunal confines it to five conditions: expression of the wish prior to 12 June 2026; addressed to an authority competent to receive it or required to forward it without delay; cooperation by the applicant, who must not have contributed to the postponement; expiry, already by that date, of the former time limit, taking extensions into account — «and therefore, as a general rule, with reference to expressions of the wish prior to 1 June 2026», which excludes a person who expressed the wish between 2 and 11 June; a concretely unfavourable consequence arising from the new regime. Here the time limits had long expired, so that «the unfavourable consequence arising from the special characterisation of the procedure cannot be held against the applicant for the purposes of the right to remain».
The result coincides, by a different route, with that of Trib. Turin, 24 August 2026 and Trib. Bologna, 12 August 2026; the requirement that the delay be attributable to the Administration is shared by Trib. Bologna, 4 September 2026.
Related provisions